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1Automotive Threat Assessment Design for
Combined Braking and Steering Maneuvers
Mohammad Aliab, Esteban Gelsob and Jonas Sjo¨bergb
Abstract—The active safety systems available on the passenger
cars market today, automatically deploy automated safety inter-
ventions in situations where the driver is in need of assistance. In
this paper, we consider the process of determining whether such
interventions are needed. In particular, we design a threat assess-
ment method which evaluates the risk that the vehicle will either
leave the road or its maneuverability will be significantly reduced
within a finite time horizon. The proposed threat assessment
method accounts for combined braking and steering maneuvers,
which results in a nonlinear dynamical vehicle behavior. We for-
mulate the threat assessment problem as a nonconvex constraint
satisfaction problem and implement an algorithm that solves
it through interval-based consistency techniques. Experimental
validation of the proposed approach indicates that constraint
violation can be predicted, while avoiding the detection of false
threats.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers the threat assessment problem in au-
tomotive driver assistance systems. In particular, we consider
automotive safety systems with the capability of activating
automated safety interventions in case there is a risk that
the vehicle will depart the road. According to [1], roadway
departure accidents account for approximately half of traffic
related fatalities [1]. Several systems that attempt reducing
such accident either through warnings or interventions have
therefore been proposed [2, 3]. A common problem in safety
systems is the problem of determining whether a situation
is critical such that an automated intervention needs to be
activated. We refer to this problem as the threat assessment
problem.
A challenging aspect of the threat assessment problem is
that it is inherently associated with potentially conflicting
objectives. On one hand, safety systems need to detect critical
situations and adequately assist the driver whenever this is
necessary in order to ensure vehicle safety. On the other hand,
alerts or interventions which drivers consider unnecessary,
contribute negatively to their confidence in such systems. A
highlighting example of this, is the case where a safety system
suddenly performs an unmotivated full braking intervention.
If such an unmotivated intervention occurs, the driver’s confi-
dence in the safety system would be seriously compromised.
In commercially available safety systems, interventions are
therefore often suppressed in uncertain situations and issued
only once accidents have become unavoidable for the driver.
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In [4], we presented a model based threat assessment
method, specifically accounting for limitations in the vehicle’s
and the driver’s ability in safely driving the vehicle. We
proposed a solution to the problem of evaluating whether an
admissible steering maneuver exists, that can drive the vehicle,
while keeping it within a prescribed subset of the state and
input space, where the driver is deemed capable of preserving
vehicle safety. The underlying idea is that, if such a steering
maneuver does not exist, the driver can be deemed incapable
of maintaining safety without assistance and an autonomous
assisting intervention is thus motivated.
In this paper we extend the problem formulation and instead
propose a solution to the problem of evaluating whether an
admissible combined steering and braking maneuver exists,
that can drive the vehicle while maintaining it within a
prescribed subset of the state and input space. Just like in
[4], the underlying idea is that, if such a maneuver does not
exist, the driver can be deemed incapable of maintaining safety
without assistance. By excluding the possible existence of
combined maneuvers, the risk for unwanted interventions is
even further reduced and autonomous assisting interventions
are thus even more motivated.
Although the reachability analysis tools used to develop the
method we proposed in [4] are powerful, they are restricted
to linear (and piece-wise affine) systems with polyhedral
constraints. Dynamical models that simultaneously capture
a vehicle’s longitudinal and lateral dynamics are however,
in general, nonlinear. In the design of threat assessment
algorithms that account for combined braking and steering,
the restriction to reachability analysis tools for linear systems
can thus be limiting. For systems with nonlinear dynamics
and possibly nonlinear, non-convex constraints, reachable sets
are more difficult to compute. In [5], the reachable set for a
nonlinear system is approximated by considering a large num-
ber of candidate trajectories generated using rapidly-exploring
random trees. This method can generate a large number of
candidate trajectories but the resulting reachable set is always
a subset of the true reachable set. A different approach is
considered in [6], where an algorithm for computing the
backward reachable set for a nonlinear system is presented.
The approach proposed in [6] however requires the solution
of a time-dependant partial differential equation which, like
many other approaches, is associated with high memory and
computational costs. A discussion on algorithms for computing
reachable sets for complex systems is provided in [7].
In the approach presented here, we reformulate our threat
assessment problem as a constraint satisfaction problem with
nonlinear equality constraints. This is a non-convex problem
2formulation. In solving this problem we resort to interval-
based consistency techniques, which have been applied in
several different domains. Examples are model-based fault
detection, model-based fault diagnosis, robust control and
robotics, see e.g. [8].
When using interval techniques the solution sets (see Defi-
nition 1) are represented by one or several intervals or boxes.
By restricting the sets to this limited structure, the interval
based methods can be used to obtain approximative solutions
to nonconvex constraint satisfaction problems, enabling the
possibility to utilize nonlinear models and constraints. As will
be shown in Section IV, these solutions can be arbitrarily
close to the true solutions if sufficient computational resources
are available. Nevertheless, in reality computational resources
are always limited and the interval based approaches offer
a flexible trade-off between computation time and accuracy.
Iteratively they improve the accuracy of the approximate
solution and this can continue until the computational time is
finished. Then a solution, which is guaranteed to enclose the
true solution is returned. This means that a result is returned
even when the available computational time is insufficient to
achieve the desired accuracy. For algorithms that run in real-
time, this is an important benefit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the models used in the threat assessment algorithm
to describe the vehicle behavior. In Section III, the threat
assessment problem is formulated as a constraint satisfaction
problem. Section IV introduces the fundamental concepts
of interval analysis. The proposed algorithm for the threat
assessment problem is presented in Section V. In Section VI
we present experimental results obtained with the proposed
algorithm. Finally, in Section VII we close the paper with
final remarks.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODELS
To describe the vehicle motion within the lane, we use a
standard single-track vehicle model, illustrated in Figure 1.
Consider the following differential equations,
mv˙x = mvyψ˙ + 2
[
Fxf + Fxr
]
, (1a)
mv˙y = −mvxψ˙ + 2
[
Fyf + Fyr
]
, (1b)
Jzψ¨ = 2[lfFyf − lrFyr ], (1c)
e˙ψ = ψ˙ − ψ˙d, (1d)
e˙y = vy cos(eψ) + vx sin(eψ), (1e)
where, m and Jz denote the vehicle mass and yaw inertia,
respectively, Fyf , Fyr are the lateral tire forces at the front
and rear axles, respectively, Fxf , Fxr are the longitudinal
tire forces at the front and rear axles, respectively and vx
and vy denote the vehicle’s longitudinal and lateral velocity
components, respectively. ψ denotes the vehicle direction of
travel in a fixed global frame and ψ˙ denotes the vehicle
rotation rate around a vertical axis located at the vehicle’s
center of gravity. lf and lr denote the distances of the front
and rear axles, respectively, from the vehicle center of gravity
as shown in Figure 1. ey denotes the distance of the vehicle
center of gravity from the road centerline. ψd is the orientation
Fig. 1. Vehicle modeling notation.
of the road centerline, i.e., the orientation of the tangent to the
curve Γd in the point O in Figure 1 and eψ = ψ − ψd is the
vehicle orientation in the lane.
In a real-time application, the road curvature c(s), where s
denotes distance along the road ahead of the vehicle might be
obtained from a digital map or through a vision system. The
sensing technologies in e.g. [9] can be used for this purpose.
Further, assuming s˙ ≈ vx, the exogenous disturbance signal
ψ˙d, can then be approximated through the relation ψ˙d = cvx.
Hence, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1: We assume an estimate of ψ˙d is available
over a future finite time horizon.
Forces acting on the vehicle are generated at the contact
patch between tire and road. We denote by fxi and fyi the
force components acting along the longitudinal and lateral tire
axis, which lead to the following longitudinal and lateral force
components in the vehicle body frame,
Fxf = fxf cos(δ)− fyf sin(δ), Fxr = fxr , (2a)
Fyf = fxf sin(δ) + fyf cos(δ), Fyr = fyr . (2b)
We assume the vehicle is front wheel driven and calculate
the longitudinal force components as,
fxf = ρfx, fxr = (1 − ρ)fx, if fx ≤ 0
fxf = fx, fxr = 0, if fx ≥ 0 (3)
where ρ gives the brake distribution between the front and rear
axle imposed by the design of the brake system and the total
longitudinal force fx is considered as an input signal.
The lateral tire force components are computed using a
simplified version of the magic tire formula [10],
fyi = ϕify0i , fy0i = µFzi sin (Ci arctan(Bi αi)),
ϕi =
√
(µFzi )
2
−f2xi
µFzi
, i ∈ {f, r}, (4)
where Bi and Ci are stiffness and shape coefficients, respec-
tively, at the two axles, αi are tire slip angles, µ is the friction
coefficient and Fzi denotes the normal force. fy0i is the lateral
force in pure cornering conditions. However, simultaneous
acceleration and cornering results in a reduced lateral force.
This effect is modeled by multiplying fy0i with ϕi in (4), [10].
Assuming small angles, the tire slip angles are approximated
as,
αf =
vy + lf ψ˙
vx
− δ, αr = vy − lrψ˙
vx
, (5)
3where δ denotes the steering angle at the front wheel and is
also considered an input signal.
The friction coefficient µ in (4) is considered an exogenous
disturbance signal.
Assumption 2: In this paper, at each time instant, we will
assume an estimate of µ is available and this is kept constant
over a finite time horizon.
In general, friction estimation is however difficult and requires
high excitation of the vehicle dynamics. In addition, the most
common estimation techniques, based on vehicle dynamics
signals, provide estimates of the friction coefficient at the
current position but not for the coming road. See e.g. [11, 12]
for an overview on friction estimation techniques.
We write the model (1)-(5) in the following compact form,
x˙(t) = f(x(t),u(t),w(t)), (6)
where x =
[
vx, vy, ψ˙, eψ, ey
]T
, u = [fx, δ]
T
and
w =
[
ψ˙d, µ
]
are the state, input and disturbance vectors
respectively.
A. Constraints
In this section, we express the requirements that the vehicle
stays in the lane while operating in a stable operating region
as constraints on the vehicle state, input and disturbance
variables.
Let eyij , i ∈ {f, r}, j ∈ {l, r}, be the distances of the
four vehicle corners from the lane centerline (eyfr is shown
in Figure 1). The requirement that the vehicle stays in the lane
is then expressed,
− eymax ≤ eyij ≤ eymax . (7)
In addition to staying in the lane, we require that the
vehicle operates in a region of the state space where the
vehicle is easily maneuverable by a normally skilled driver.
The requirement that the vehicle operates in stable operating
conditions is ensured by limiting the tire slip angles αi,
αimin ≤ αi ≤ αimax , i ∈ {f, r}. (8)
In this region the vehicle behavior is predictable by most
drivers and Electronic Stability Control (ESC) systems are
inactive.
The driver can influence the vehicle’s motion through the
input signals δ and fx. The force component fx is limited by
the available friction and the steering wheel angle δ is subject
to mechanical constraints imposed by the vehicle design. We
will also assume that, for convenience purposes, under normal
circumstances, the driver will not impose larger deceleration
and steering rate than amax, δ˙max. We express these limitations
as,
−δmax ≤ δ ≤ δmax, (9a)
−µFzi ≤ fxi ≤ µFzi , (9b)
−mamax ≤ fx ≤ 0, (9c)
−δ˙max ≤ δ˙ ≤ δ˙max. (9d)
Rate limitations for the braking force are neglected.
The constraints (7)-(9) can be compactly written as,
h(x(t), u(t), w(t)) ≤ 0, (10)
where 0 is a vector of zeros with appropriate dimension.
III. THREAT ASSESSMENT AS A CONSTRAINT
SATISFACTION PROBLEM
In this section we formulate the threat assessment problem
as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP). At each time
instant, if the vehicle state does not satisfy the constraints (10),
the vehicle’s operation can be considered unsafe. The threat
assessment problem is therefore formulated as the problem
of evaluating whether an admissible sequence of combined
steering and braking maneuvers u exists, that can drive the
system (6) over a future finite time horizon, while satisfying
the constraints (10).
Denote by,
1) V = {z1, . . . , zn}, a set of numeric variables,
2) D = {Z1, . . . ,Zn}, a set of domains where Zi, is the
domain associated with the variable zi,
3) C = {C1(z), . . . , Cm(z)}, a set of constraints where
a constraint Ci(z) is determined by a numeric relation
(equation, inequality, inclusion, etc.) linking a set of
variables under consideration.
We let CSP = (V ,D, C), denote a CSP and introduce the
following definition,
Definition 1: The solution of a CSP, sol(CSP) is the set
of numerical variables Σ for which all the constraints Ci ∈ C
are satisfied, i.e.,
Σ = {z ∈ Z |Ci(z) holds ∀Ci ∈ C}. (11)
The threat assessment CSP is formulated in discrete time,
the continuous time system (6) is therefore discretized with
a sampling time Ts to obtain the discrete time constrained
system,
x(k+1) = fd(x(k),u(k),w(k)), (12a)
hd(x(k), u(k), w(k)) ≤ 0. (12b)
The threat assessment CSP over a 1-step horizon can now
be stated as,
V = {x(k),x(k + 1),u(k),u(k + 1), e(k)},
D = {Xk,Xk+1,Uk,Uk+1, Ek},
C = {hd(x(k + 1), u(k + 1), w(k + 1)) ≤ 0,
x(k+1) = fd(x(k),u(k),w(k)),
hd(x(k), u(k), w(k)) ≤ 0,
x˜(k) = x(k) + e(k)},
(13)
where x˜(k) is the vector of state variables estimates and
e(k) represents the uncertainty associated with the estimates.
For each estimate, the uncertainty is considered unknown but
bounded, i.e. e(k) ∈ Ek, for some bounded set Ek. The
symbols Xk, Uk, denote the domains associated with the state
and input vectors at time step k, respectively. We note that, in
the CSP (13), the disturbance signals w(k), w(k+1) are not
4considered as part of the set of numerical variables V . This is
a consequence of the Assumptions 1 and 2 where estimates
of the disturbance signal are assumed available. We remark
that if the accuracy of the available sensor setup is poor, it is
possible to account for uncertainties by including these signals
in V and associated (uncertainty) domains Wk, Wk+1 in the
set of domains D. The N -step threat assessment CSP can be
formulated by repetition of (13).
IV. SOLVING CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION PROBLEMS
USING INTERVAL TECHNIQUES
Several methods can be used to find the solution Σ to a
CSP (Definition 1). This section gives a brief introduction to
interval based consistency techniques, which have been used
in the results presented in this paper.
In interval-based consistency techniques, the solution to
a CSP, Σ, is approximated by one or several intervals or
boxes [z]i. The solution, Σ, is obtained by pruning the initial
domain of the variables of the CSP, and through successive
elimination of subboxes which cannot contain the solution.
The consistency techniques most commonly used are known
as Hull-consistency (also called 2B-consistency) and Box-
consistency, or are variations of them, [13]. In general, in-
terval techniques are associated with wrapping of generic sets
into boxes, decomposition of constraints and use of interval
operations which leads to overestimation of the solution Σ.
This overestimation can be done arbitrarily tight with the
cost of increased computational time, as will be described in
the following example. In this manuscript we utilize interval
techniques which provide an outer approximation Σˆ that is
guaranteed to enclose the true solution Σ. The choice of such
techniques is commented in Section V.
We illustrate the main functionality of the interval tech-
niques through a simple example while for a rigorous treat-
ment of consistency techniques for CSPs we refer the in-
terested reader to [14, 8]. For the sake of clear and easy
presentation, a simplified approach has been adopted in the
example.
Example 1: Consider the nonlinear discrete time state-
space model,
x1(k + 1) = −0.32
√
x1(k) + x1(k) + 0.36
√
x2(k), (14a)
x2(k + 1) = −0.07
√
x2(k) + x2(k), (14b)
with its real variables x1 and x2 ranging in the domains
[0.3, 0.36] × [0.205, 0.3], which defines D. Assume that the
state variables at k = 0 belong to the intervals [x1(0)] =
[0.304, 0.336] and [x2(0)] = [0.256, 0.284], respectively. We
are interested in computing the solution set Σ at time instant
k = 2, i.e., {x(k) ∈ D with k ∈ {0, 1, 2}| x(k + 1) =
fd(x(k)),x(0) ∈ [x(0)]}, where fd(x(k)) is defined by (14).
We start from [x(0)] which in this example is already a box,
hence no wrapping is needed. We utilize a natural inclusion
function [fd] to propagate [x(0)] two time steps and obtain
interval approximations of {x(1),x(2) ∈ D| x(k + 1) =
fd(x(k)), x(0) ∈ [x(0)]}. Figure 2(a) shows [x(0)], the
computed approximations [x(1)] = [fd]([x(0)]), [x(2)] =
[fd]([x(1)]) and D. We note that portions of [x(1)] and [x(2)]
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2. Approximated solution sets Σˆ for the problem considered in Exam-
ple 1 with increasing accuracy from left to right. The outer approximation Σˆ
of the solution Σ is calculated using Box-consistency and a splitting step that
generates sub-boxes by a succession of bisections of [x1(0)] and [x2(0)].
The green (brighter) sets show the domain D and the blue (darker) sets show
the solution sets at time steps k = 0, 1, 2.
lie inside D hence they cannot be excluded from the solution
set at this point. We also note that a portion of [x(2)] lies
outside D which indicates that the initial region [x(0)] is
potentially too large.
In order to improve the accuracy of the solution we split the
initial box [x(0)] into four sub-boxes. We utilize the inclusion
function [fd] again to propagate the four sub-boxes two time
steps. The obtained results are shown in Figure 2(b). We note
that, at k = 2 two of the boxes are totally outside the domain
D. Consequently they can be excluded from the solution set
Σˆ (for all k) and higher accuracy of the solution set can be
obtained.
The process of splitting and propagating boxes can be con-
tinued until the desired accuracy has been reached, the solution
is empty or the computational time is out. In Figure 2(c) the
result after four divisions of the boxes is shown. Clearly, the
solutions in Figure 2(c) are smaller and more accurate than
the solutions in Figure 2(a).
V. INTERVAL-BASED THREAT ASSESSMENT ALGORITHM
In Section III, we formulated the threat assessment prob-
lem as a constraint satisfaction problem and in Section IV
we showed how such problems can be solved with interval
techniques. In this section we formulate the threat assessment
algorithm which is to be repeatedly solved in an automotive
safety system.
Denote by Wk = [wk,wk+1, . . . ,wk+N−1] a sequence
of disturbance samples over the horizon [k, k + N − 1]. We
formulate an N -step threat assessment CSP and enforce the
constraints (10) to hold for each time step over a finite time
5Fig. 3. Test track used to collect the experimental data. The darker color
vehicle’s denote vehicle positions at times ai, the symbol ◦ denotes the vehicle
positions at times bi, the brighter color vehicle’s denote the vehicle positions
at times ci and the symbol 2 denotes the vehicle positions at times di.
horizon of N steps,
V = {x(k), . . . ,x(k +N − 1), u(k), . . . ,u(k +N − 1),
e(k)},
D = {[x(k)], . . . , [x(k +N − 1)], [u(k)], . . . ,
[u(k +N − 1)], [e(k)]},
C = {x(i+ 1) = fd(x(i),u(i),w(i)), i = k, . . . , k +N − 2,
hd(x(i),u(i),w(i)) ≤ 0, i = k, . . . , k +N − 1,
x˜(k) = x(k) + e(k)},
CSPTA = (V ,D, C).
(15)
A threat assessment algorithm that sets a safety flag in
case the threat assessment CSP (15) has an empty solution,
hereby referred to as Algorithm 1, has been implemented. In
Algorithm 1 an interval-based branch and prune algorithm is
used to find the solution Σˆ = sol(CSPTA), of the threat
assessment CSP (15). As noted in Section IV, the solution
Σˆ obtained with the interval solver is an outer approximation
that encloses the true solution Σ, i.e., Σ ⊆ Σˆ. Consequently
Σˆ = ∅ =⇒ Σ = ∅, hence, based on the model (12), a
violation of the constraints (10) can be guaranteed within
the horizon of N -steps if Σˆ is empty. In such case, a flag
notSafe is set, activating an autonomous intervention or
warning. Waiting until Σˆ = ∅, reduces the risk of activating
autonomous interventions in situations where the driver is not
in need of assistance. However, if the difference between the
sets Σˆ and Σ is large, the autonomous intervention might be
delayed which limits the effect of the intervention.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to validate the proposed threat assessment ap-
proach, experimental testing has been conducted at a test track
located approximately 100 km outside Go¨teborg, Sweden. The
test track is about 5 km long and is shown in Figure 3.
Measurements of the state variables and disturbances were
collected using a differential GPS unit, a built-in high precision
inertial measurement unit along with a digital map. The test
vehicle was driven several laps by a professional driver, which
adopted both a normal and rougher driving style. In the
normal driving case, the driver was asked to keep the posted
speed limits, while in the rougher driving case, the driver was
driving as fast as possible. During driving, the proposed threat
assessment was inactive and the collected data has instead
been post-processed through Algorithm 1 using a laptop PC.
This enables the possibility to evaluate the performance of
the threat assessment approach without influencing the vehicle
motion and driver behavior through safety interventions. For
the post-processing with Algorithm 1, no upper bound on the
computational time was set.
The parameter values used are provided in Tables I and II.
TABLE I
VEHICLE MODEL PARAMETERS
m [kg] Jz [kgm2] lf [m] lr [m]
1695 2617 1.14 1.50
a [m] b [m] w [m] µ [-]
1.83 2.69 1.77 1
Bf [-] Br [-] Cf , Cr [-] ρ [-]
-10.5 -12.7 0.5 0.6
TABLE II
DESIGN PARAMETERS
eymax [m] αfmin , αrmin [◦] αfmax , αrmax [◦]
1.61 -4 4
amax [m/s2] δmax [◦] δ˙max [◦/s]
2 7 15
Ts [ms] N [-]
40 11
The parameters in Table I are vehicle specific parameters while
the parameters in Table II are design parameters. The desired
behavior of a safety system is subjective and, just like with
e.g. stability control systems, drivers have different preferences
on activation timing and control authority. Large values of
the bounds in Table II delay interventions and can jeopardies
safety while small values will lead to a system that intervenes
often and might be perceived as intrusive. For a commercial
application, it is possible to give drivers possibility to choose
from a set of parameter configurations to accommodate the
needs and preferences of different drivers. In this paper, the
performance of the threat assessment algorithm has been
tuned and evaluated based on its ability to predict constraint
violations that actually occur and avoiding false constraint
violation predictions, rather than relying on preferences of
specific drivers. The bound eymax has been set by the road
width and the rest of the design parameters in Table II have
been tuned by balancing between maintaining a capability to
detect threats while avoiding interventions when no constraint
violation is imminent.
Uncertainties in the state estimates have been accounted for
by setting,
[e(k)] = [e1(k)]× [e2(k)]× [e3(k)]× [e4(k)]× [e5(k)],
ei(k) = [−0.05|x˜i(k)|, 0.05|x˜i(k)|] , i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
(16)
where x˜i(k) denotes the i-th component of the measured state
vector x˜(k). We remark that, potentially, the performance
6Fig. 4. (a)-(f) compare the approximated solution set Σˆ obtained through
Algorithm 1 at position b1 to measured vehicle states and steering angles. Each
box shows predicted admissible variables for each step over the prediction
horizon and the red solid line shows the actual trajectory traversed by the
vehicle.
of the proposed threat assessment method could be further
improved by utilizing knowledge about the measurement ac-
curacy of the sensors used to acquire the state estimates.
The performance of the proposed algorithm where combined
steering and braking maneuvers of the driver are considered
is compared to a previously published algorithm where only
steering is considered. We will refer to this alternative al-
gorithm as Algorithm 2. In Algorithm 2, the vehicle model
is linear and the threat assessment problem is then easier to
solve. Details about the alternative algorithm are provided in
[15]. The proposed threat assessment algorithm, Algorithm 1,
proved capable of predicting violation of the constraints (10)
within the prediction horizon without issuing any false detec-
tions in the considered dataset.
Next, we show results obtained in the situations illustrated
in Figure 3, where the following notation is used: ai denotes a
time instant where the Algorithm 1 returns notSafe = 1, i.e.,
when the solution set Σˆ is empty. In Figure 3, the vehicle
positions at times ai are marked out with a darker color
vehicle. bi = ai − 100ms and corresponding positions are
marked with the symbol ◦ in Figure 3. These positions have
been indicated for analysis purposes. ci are time instances
where the alternative (steering only) threat assessment algo-
rithm, Algorithm 2, predicts a constraint violation and the
corresponding positions are marked with the brighter color
vehicle in Figure 3. Finally, di denotes a time instance where
a violation of the constraints (10) occurs and corresponding
positions are marked with the symbol .
Consider the time instances d1, d2 and d3. At times, d1, d2,
the vehicle is traveling at a speed of approximately 90 km/h
and at d3 the speed is approximately 110 km/h. We note
that, at these time instances, the vehicle violates the position
constraints (7) by crossing the lane marking at the inner side
of the curves. In Figure 3, the positions at the time instances
c1, c2, c3 indicate that Algorithm 2 predicts these situations
somewhat early. At the times c1, c2, c3 it is according to
Algorithm 2 no longer possible to avoid a constraint violation
by the adopted steering only approach. Figures 4, 5 and 6,
show the solution sets Σˆ obtained by Algorithm 1, at times
b1, b2 and b3 respectively. At these time instances the
Fig. 5. (a)-(f) compare the approximated solution set Σˆ obtained through
Algorithm 1 at position b2 to measured vehicle states and steering angles. Each
box shows predicted admissible variables for each step over the prediction
horizon and the red solid line shows the actual trajectory traversed by the
vehicle.
Fig. 6. (a)-(f) compare the approximated solution set Σˆ obtained through
Algorithm 1 at position b3 to measured vehicle states and steering angles. Each
box shows predicted admissible variables for each step over the prediction
horizon and the red solid line shows the actual trajectory traversed by the
vehicle.
solution sets Σˆ are not empty which indicates that, potentially,
there exists some combined braking and steering action that
can keep the vehicle within the lane from these positions.
Nevertheless, the Figures 4, 5 and 6 show that the driver
chooses to maintain the high velocity and steering angle in
these situations. Potentially, the driver was willing to risk
slightly crossing the lane markings in order to be able to
maintain a high speed throughout the curve, while keeping
away from the outer lane border. Consequently at times a1, a2
and a3 the solution sets Σˆ are empty, hence at these points,
according to the assumed model and control limitations, the
constraint violation has become unavoidable. At these time
instances, it took the algorithm 690ms, 300ms and < 1ms,
respectively, to conclude that Σˆ is empty.
If the available actuators can overcome the assumed control
limitations of the driver, an assisting intervention might be
issued in such situations in order to avoid the imminent
constraint violation. In Figure 3 we note that an intervention
based on Algorithm 2, would come early and hence increase
the possibility of avoiding the constraint violation as compared
to Algorithm 1 which, as noted in Figure 3, detects the
constraint violation late. In general however, curve cutting
is often actively chosen by the driver and thus becomes
7Fig. 7. (a)-(f) compare the approximated solution set Σˆ obtained through
Algorithm 1 at position b4 to measured vehicle states and steering angles. Each
box shows predicted admissible variables for each step over the prediction
horizon and the red solid line shows the actual trajectory traversed by the
vehicle.
unavoidable very late. In such situations, the driver might thus
perceive an early intervention as intrusive.
Let us instead consider the situation occurring between
the time instances c4 and d5 where the relation between
excessive speed and the constraint violations is more clear. At
time c4, the vehicle is traveling at a speed of approximately
85 km/h and Algorithm 2 indicates that it is not possible
to avoid a constraint violation within the prediction horizon
by steering only. At time b4, the vehicle speed has been
slightly reduced to 84 km/h and Algorithm 1 can still find
a nonempty solution set Σˆ. The obtained solution set Σˆ is
reported in Figure 7 and indicates that constraint violations
are potentially still avoidable through combined braking and
steering. A safety intervention, triggered by Algorithm 2 might
in this case have been considered unnecessary or at least
early since no constraint violation occurred within the time
interval [c4, c4 + NTs]. Nevertheless it turns out that the
speed reduction adopted by the driver is insufficient. At time
a4, Algorithm 1 indicates that a constraint violation is no
longer avoidable, after < 1ms of computational time. At time
d4 ∈ [a4, a4 +NTs], the vehicle indeed violates the stability
constraints (8), hence the constraint violation predicted by
Algorithm 1 can be considered correct.
The experimental vehicle was equipped with an electronic
stability control system which, in this situation, was activated.
The stability control system can apply braking to individual
wheels and is thus not restricted by the assumed control
limitations of the driver. By braking individual wheels, ad-
ditional yaw moment is generated by the stability system
forcing the vehicle back in to the stable operating region.
Keeping the vehicle in the lane is however not an objective
of the electronic stability system. Instead, the driver needs
to steer the vehicle correctly in order to stay in the lane. In
this case, even though the vehicle is forced back in to the
stable operating region, the stabilizing intervention combined
with the driver’s steering action does not keep the vehicle
in the lane. At time a5, Algorithm 1 recognizes that even
though the vehicle is operating within the stable operating
region, due to the position and motion of the vehicle, a
violation of the constraints (7) is unavoidable. This took
Fig. 8. (a)-(f) compare the approximated solution set Σˆ obtained through
Algorithm 1 at position b5 to measured vehicle states and steering angles. Each
box shows predicted admissible variables for each step over the prediction
horizon and the red solid line shows the actual trajectory traversed by the
vehicle.
Fig. 9. (a)-(f) compare the approximated solution set Σˆ obtained through
Algorithm 1 at position b6 to measured vehicle states and steering angles. Each
box shows predicted admissible variables for each step over the prediction
horizon and the red solid line shows the actual trajectory traversed by the
vehicle.
28ms. At time d5 ∈ [a5, a5 + NTs], the vehicle’s front left
corner indeed crosses the outer lane marking violating the
constraints (7) as predicted by Algorithm 1. In this situation,
both the violations of the stability constraints at time d4 and
the position constraints at time d5, seems to be related to
the excessive speed adopted when the vehicle approached the
curve. In this case, a braking safety intervention issued based
on either Algorithm 1 at the time instant a4 or by Algorithm
2 at the time instant c4 might have reduced the speed enough
to avoid the constraint violations.
Finally we highlight that, in the considered dataset, no false
constraint violations where indicated by Algorithm 1, while
Algorithm 2, in some cases, predicted constraint violations
which the driver managed to avoid by reducing speed. As an
example, consider the point corresponding to the time instant
b6, shown in Figure 3. In this point, the solution set obtained in
Algorithm 2 is empty. Since no subsequent constraint violation
occurs however, this can be considered a false threat detection.
The solution set obtained with Algorithm 1 is on the other hand
nonempty and is shown in Figure 9. We note that the solution
set obtained with Algorithm 1 encloses the actual trajectory
traversed by the vehicle and that no intervention is needed in
this scenario.
8VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A model based threat assessment method, which accounts
for combined braking and steering maneuvers in assessing the
risk of unintended roadway departures has been presented and
evaluated using experimental data. Compared to previously
published approaches, which account for steering only, the
present method reduces the risk of false threat detection while
maintaining the ability to predict constraint violations. The
preliminary results presented in this manuscript motivate fur-
ther investigation of the algorithm’s ability to predict constraint
violations and the frequency of false threat detections.
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